



TYPES AND STAGES OF THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

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Article history:	Abstract:
Received: 10 th March 2023 Accepted: 10 th April 2023 Published: 20 th May 2023	The article analyzes the types and stages of the fight against corruption, which is considered the key to development. Also, the author expressed his opinion on the wide-scale reforms in the fight against corruption in the Republic of Uzbekistan in recent years based on various legal documents.
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Nowadays, there are no known methods in pedagogy and management that guarantee that a person will become an ideal official. However, there are many countries with very low levels of corruption. In addition, there are historical examples where efforts to reduce corruption have led to significant progress: Singapore, Hong Kong, Portugal, and Switzerland. This supports the existence of clear anti-corruption methods.

From the official point of view, if there is no state, there is no corruption. Many functions of the state have a fixed basis and cannot be eliminated: for example, it is impossible to fight corruption in tax authorities by abolishing all taxes. Nevertheless, in a situation where corruption is almost everywhere, disbanding corrupt state bodies seems to be one of the most effective radical ways to get rid of it.

There are three approaches to reducing corruption, other than disbanding government agencies.

First, laws and enforcement can be tightened, thereby increasing the risk of punishment.

Second, it is possible to create economic mechanisms that allow officials to increase their income without breaking the rules and laws.

Third, the role of markets and competition can be increased, thereby reducing the profits from corruption. The latter also includes competition in the provision of public services, with some state bodies duplicating the functions of other bodies. Most of the well-established methods relate to internal or external control mechanisms.

This includes the internal mechanisms and incentives available in the management apparatus: clear standards for officials to perform their duties and strict control over each employee. To ensure control, special departments that work autonomously are often distinguished. For example, law enforcement agencies are often subordinated to the head of the executive

branch like a bureaucratic apparatus, but at the same time, they retain considerable independence.

Internal control was the main method of fighting corruption in absolutist monarchies and remains highly effective. In particular, in Machiavelli's monarchies, "rule by servants" corruption is less dangerous because all "servants" owe the benefit of the sovereign and it is more difficult to bribe.

This includes mechanisms with a high degree of independence from the executive. There are such mechanisms in the United Nations Convention against Corruption. [1] An independent judiciary, where a bureaucrat who breaks the law can be easily and effectively prosecuted, would dramatically reduce the potential attractiveness of corruption. Freedom of speech and media is one of the most effective means of controlling bureaucratic corruption.

External control is characteristic of market economies and liberal democracies. Perhaps this is because, for the normal functioning of the market, clear rules and mechanisms are required to ensure the fulfillment of obligations, including an effective legal system that ensures a healthy competitive environment. Liberal democracy also relies on an electoral system, the rule of law, independent justice, separation of powers, and a system of checks and balances to achieve its goals. [2;68] All these political institutions simultaneously serve as mechanisms of external control over corruption. [3] However, not all the rules of liberal democracy are particularly helpful in fighting corruption. For example, the principle of separation of powers. The distribution of powers encourages them to control each other horizontally. For example, in a parliamentary democracy, the representative power has the power to dissolve the government. On the other hand, in a presidential democracy, the branches of government are more functionally divided. Nevertheless, corruption in presidential republics is usually as high as in parliamentary ones, which may be due to the difficulty



of the presidential impeachment procedure. In addition, the distribution of powers at the regional level and thus the transfer of a large part of the powers of the executive power to the level of local self-government leads to an effective reduction of the number of state bodies. This increases the information transparency of the authorities and reduces corruption. Nevertheless, the federal structure of the state ensures maximum decentralization, often leading to the regulation of different aspects of the same activity by different levels of officials and, as a result, more corruption than in unitary states. [4]

In democracies, the main method of punishing elected representatives for corruption is to remove them from power at the next election. This means that the voter himself is responsible for the level of honesty and responsibility of the people he elects. Despite the high efficiency of elections as a weapon against corruption, their effect is manifested very slowly. Every 30 years of a stable democratic system has the same effect on corruption as a true transition to a liberal democratic model of government.

Several authors argue that flaws in the electoral process can have a significant impact on the extent of corruption. Even if elections are held without irregularities, the system itself may encourage voters to vote for a candidate for ideological reasons, ignoring the corruption of the candidate personally, his subordinates, or his party as a whole. This hypothesis was confirmed. Countries with multiple representatives per district under a majoritarian system have significantly less corruption than countries with proportional elections and closed party lists or countries with small constituencies and one representative per district. This is because the majoritarian system provides the greatest individual accountability, and electing multiple representatives or open party lists greatly increases voters' attention to the integrity of the candidates.

Eliminating the above-mentioned causes of corruption is also an anti-corruption measure.

Unconstitutionality of corruption norms. Any norms that impose restrictions on a citizen can lead to corruption, except for norms describing constitutional freedoms and human rights. The latter imposes restrictions on state power, not on individuals, which is an institutional guarantee both against excessive demands of the law and on arbitrary powers of state authorities. [5] Norms of corruption inevitably violate the rights and freedoms of people and citizens defined in the Constitution. It is possible to determine the norms of corruption within the framework of an independent anti-corruption examination.

Provision of information to citizens. This method includes analysis of laws to clearly and clearly explain to citizens what their rights and obligations are, what

offenses should lead to them, how the court procedure goes, and what it takes into account. Knowing all this, citizens behave more confidently when they face an official who encourages them to bribe.

The openness of departmental systems. Transparency of interagency operations and related civilian oversight can be achieved through public Internet publication and open discussion of interagency documents, which can seriously undermine the foundations of corruption. However, such mechanisms are limited by excessively strict rules on the protection of commercial secrets, or their use in some departments is associated with the need to take additional measures to protect the personal information of citizens and confidential information in defense departments and organizations.

A serious problem for the implementation of open information systems is the lack of authority of officials who not only know about the benefits of free licenses but also cannot include in government contracts the requirements for providing open reading rights to version control systems of software products developed with taxpayers' money.

Social security of officials. First-class medical care, interest-free loans for the purchase of the real estate, a large pension - all this equates to an increase in wages in the public sector, and therefore increases the loss of an official if he falls into corrupt practices. Studies show that this measure has no immediate effect on corruption, but improves the quality of bureaucracy over time.

The essence of the problem in the fight against corruption was formulated by James Madison: "If men were ruled by angels, there would be no need for external and internal control over the government. But the chief difficulty in creating a government where men govern men is, first, that judgment must be secured to control the persons governed; but after that, it is necessary to force the ruling authorities to control themselves". [6, 14;30]

One of the most important factors in preventing corruption is the criminal law. In practice, laws in most countries are narrow enough to define the types of corruption that are criminalized to eliminate the risk of selective enforcement of legislation to suppress civil liberties and dissent. Therefore, for example, if there is an intention to influence an official, a gift can be considered a bribe. If an official is not prohibited from accepting gifts in principle, then it is usually difficult to prove the fact of bribery. In contrast, embezzlement is often proven when the damage is done, regardless of whether the employee intended to steal the funds.

Another difficulty, especially in the case of large-scale corruption, when most individuals pay bribes, is known in psychology and game theory as the "prisoner's



dilemma." [15] On the one hand, if everyone stops paying bribes, then everyone will benefit. But if only one private person refuses to accept a bribe, then he puts himself in a very disadvantageous situation.

Finally, the stability of the aforementioned corruption markets is a serious problem.

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