DIGITAL GATEKEEPERS AND COMPETITION LAW: TOWARDS NEW RULES FOR PLATFORM DOMINANCE
Keywords:
digital gatekeepers, platform dominance, competition lawAbstract
This article examines the growing influence of digital gatekeepers—large online platforms that control access to digital markets—and the challenges they pose to existing competition law frameworks. It explores how traditional antitrust principles struggle to address new forms of market power rooted in data concentration, network effects and algorithmic control. Drawing on recent policy developments such as the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) and proposals in the United States, the paper highlights the emergence of ex-ante regulatory approaches aimed at preventing the abuse of platform dominance. The study also discusses implications for global competition policy and suggests directions for crafting more effective legal rules to maintain fair competition in digital ecosystems.
References
1. Update competition law
frameworks: National regulatory regimes
should integrate provisions that explicitly
address the unique dynamics of data-driven,
multi-sided digital markets, moving beyond
traditional price-based criteria.
2. Develop clear dominance
indicators: Authorities should adopt
methodologies that consider factors like data
control, network effects and ecosystem
dependency when determining platform
dominance.
3. Strengthen regulatory oversight:
Invest in technological tools (regtech) that
enable real-time monitoring of digital market
behavior, including algorithmic outcomes and
data usage patterns.
4. Promote data portability and
interoperability: Implement legal
requirements that empower users to easily
transfer their data across platforms, reducing
lock-in effects and fostering competition.
5. Encourage international
cooperation: Given the cross-border nature of
digital platforms, collaborative efforts among
competition authorities will be crucial to ensure
coherent and effective enforcement.
REFERENCES
1. Köhler, K., & Thomas, L. (2021). Regulating
digital gatekeepers: A comparative policy
analysis. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement,
9(2), 354–378.
2. Khan, L. M. (2017). Amazon’s antitrust paradox.
Yale Law Journal, 126(3), 710–805.
3. Kokkoris, I., & Olczak, M. (2023). Platform
dominance and data: Rethinking antitrust in the
digital age. World Competition, 46(1), 35–58.
4. European Commission. (2020). Proposal for a
Regulation on contestable and fair markets in
the digital sector (Digital Markets Act).
COM(2020) 842 final.
5. Stucke, M. E., & Ezrachi, A. (2016). Virtual
competition: The promise and perils of the
algorithm-driven economy. Harvard University
Press.
6. United States Federal Trade Commission.
(2021). Statement on the FTC’s enforcement
priorities regarding platforms and data.
Retrieved from https://www.ftc.gov/
7. Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic
institutions of capitalism. Free Press.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
